Businesses (retailers) often wish to offer personalized advertisements (coupons) to individuals (consumers), but run the risk of strong reactions from consumers who want a customized shopping experience but feel their privacy has been violated. Existing models for privacy such as differential privacy or information theory try to quantify privacy risk but do not capture the subjective experience and heterogeneous expression of privacy-sensitivity. We propose a Markov decision process (MDP) model to capture: (i) different consumer privacy sensitivities via a timevarying state; (ii) different coupon types (action set) for the retailer; and (iii) the action-and-state-dependent cost for perceived privacy violations. For the simple case with two states ("Normal" and "Alerted"), two coupons (targeted and untargeted) model, and consumer behavior statistics known to the retailer, we show that a stationary threshold-based policy is the optimal coupon-offering strategy for a retailer that wishes to minimize its expected discounted cost. The threshold is a function of all model parameters; the retailer offers a targeted coupon if their belief that the consumer is in the "Alerted" state is below the threshold. We extend this simple model and results to consumers with multiple privacy-sensitivity states as well as coupon-dependent state transition probabilities.
balances their revenue objectives while being sensitive to consumer privacy concerns. The main challenge for the retailer is that the consumer's responses to coupons are not known a priori; furthermore, consumers do not "add noise" to their purchasing behavior as a mechanism to stay private. Rather, the offer of a coupon may provoke a reaction from the consumer, ranging from "indifferent" through "partially concerned" to "creeped out." This reaction is mediated by the consumer's sensitivity level to privacy violations, and it is these levels that we seek to model via a Markov decision process. These privacy-sensitivity states of the consumers are often revealed to the retailer through their purchasing patterns. In the simplest case, they may accept or reject a targeted coupon. We capture these aspects in our model and summarize our main contributions below.
Main Contributions:
We propose a partially-observed Markov decision process (POMDP) model for this problem in which the consumer's state encodes their privacy sensitivity, and the retailer can offer different levels of privacyviolating coupons. The simplest instance of our model is one with two states for the consumer, denoted as "Normal"
and "Alerted," and two types of coupons: untargeted low privacy (LP) or targeted high privacy (HP). At each time, the retailer may offer a coupon and the consumer transitions from one state to another according to a Markov chain that is independent of the offered coupon. The retailer suffers a cost that depends both on the type of coupon offered and the state of the consumer. The costs reflect the advantage of offering targeted HP coupons relative to untargeted LP ones while simultaneously capturing the risk of doing so when the consumer is already "Alerted".
Under the assumption that the retailer (via surveys or prior knowledge) knows the statistics of the consumer Markov process, i.e., the likelihoods of becoming "Alerted" and staying "Alerted", and a belief about the initial consumer state, we study the problem of determining the optimal coupon-offering policy that the retailer should adopt to minimize the long-term discounted costs of offering coupons. The simple model above is extended to multiple consumer states and coupon-dependent transitions. We model the latter via two Markov processes for the consumer, one for each type (HP or LP) of coupon such that a persnickety consumer who is easily "Alerted" will be more likely to do so when offered an HP (relative to LP) coupon. Our main results can be summarized as follows:
1) There exists an optimal, stationary, threshold-based policy for offering coupons such that an HP coupon is offered only if the belief of being in the "Alerted" state at each interaction time is below a certain threshold; this threshold is a function of all the model parameters. This structural result holds for multiple states and coupon-dependent transitions.
2) The threshold for offering a targeted HP coupon increases in the following cases: a) once "Alerted," the consumer remains so for a while -the retailer is more willing to take risks since the consumer takes a while to transition to "Normal"; b) the consumer is very unlikely to get "Alerted"; c) the cost of offering an untargeted LP coupon is high and close to the cost of offering a targeted HP coupon to an "Alerted" consumer; and d) when the retailer does not discount the future heavily, i.e., the retailer stands to benefit by offering HP coupons for a larger set of beliefs about the consumer's state.
3) For the coupon-dependent Markov model for the consumer, the threshold is lower than for the non-coupon dependent case which encapsulates the fact that highly sensitive consumers will force the retailers to behave more conservatively.
Our results use many fundamental tools and techniques from the theory of MDPs through appropriate and meaningful problem modeling. We briefly review the related literature in consumer privacy studies as well as MDPs.
Related Work:
Several economic studies have examined consumer's attitudes towards privacy via surveys and data analysis including studies on the benefits and costs of using private data (e.g., Aquisti and Grossklags in [2] ).
On the other hand, formal methods such as differential privacy are finding use in modeling the value of private data for market design [3] and for the problem of partitioning goods with private valuation function amongst the agents [4] . In these models the goal is to elicit private information from individuals. Venkitasubramaniam [5] recently used an MDP model to study data sharing in control systems with time-varying state. He minimizes the weighted sum of the utility (benefit) that the system achieves by sharing data (e.g., with a data collector) and the resulting privacy leakage, quantified using the information-theoretic equivocation function. In our work we do not quantify privacy loss directly; instead we model privacy-sensitivity and resulting user behavior via MDPs to determine interaction policies that can benefit both consumers and retailers. To the best of our knowledge, a formal model for consumer-retailer interactions and the related privacy issues has not been studied before; in particular, our work focuses on explicitly considering the consequence to the retailer of the consumers' awareness of privacy violations.
Markov decision processes (MDPs) have been widely used for decades across many fields [6] , [7] ; in particular, our model is related to problems in control with communication constraints [8] , [9] where state estimation has a cost.
Our costs are action and state dependent and we consider a different optimization problem. Classical target-search problems [10] also have optimal policies that are thresholds, but in our model the retailer goal is not to estimate the consumer state but to minimize cost. The model we use is most similar to Ross's model of product quality control with deterioration [11] , which was more recently used by Laourine and Tong to study the Gilbert-Elliot channel in wireless communications [12] , in which the channel has two states and the transmitter has two actions (transmit or not). We cannot apply their results directly due to our different cost structure, but use ideas from their proofs. Furthermore, we go beyond these works to study privacy-utility tradeoffs in consumer-retailer interactions with more than two states and action-dependent transition probabilities. We apply more general MDP analysis tools to address our formal behavioral model for privacy-sensitive consumers.
While the MDP model used in this paper is simple, its application to the problem of revenue maximization with privacy-sensitive consumers is novel. We show that the optimal stationary policy exists and it is a threshold on the probability of the consumer being alerted. We extend the model to cases of consumers with multiple states and consumers with coupon-dependent transition probabilities. In the conclusion we describe several other interesting avenues for future work.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
We model interactions between a retailer and a consumer via a discrete-time system (see Figure 1) . At each time t, the consumer has a discrete-valued state and the retailer may offer one of two coupons: high privacy risk (HP) or low privacy risk (LP). The consumer responds by imposing a cost on the retailer that depends on the coupon offered and its own state. For example, a consumer who is "alerted" (privacy-aware) may respond to an HP coupon by refusing to shop at the retailer. The retailer's goal is to decide which type of coupon to offer at each time t to minimize its cost.
A. Consumer Model
Modelling Assumption 1: (Consumer's state) We assume the consumer is in one of a finite set of states that determine their response to coupons -each state corresponds to a type of consumer behavior in terms of purchasing.
The consumer's state evolves according to a Markov process.
For this paper, we primarily focus on the two-state case; the consumer may be Normal or Alerted. Later we will extend this model to multiple consumer states. The consumer state at time t is denoted by G t ∈ {Normal, Alerted}.
If a consumer is in Normal state, the consumer is very likely to use coupons to make purchases. However, in the Alerted state, the consumer is less likely to use coupons, since it is more cautious about revealing information to the retailer. The evolution of the consumer state is modeled as an infinite-horizon discrete time Markov chain ( Figure 1 ).
The consumer starts out in a random initial state unknown to the retailer and the transition of the consumer state is independent of the action of the retailer. A belief state is a probability distribution over possible states in which the consumer could be. The belief of the consumer being in Alerted state at time t is denoted by p t . We define λ N,A = P r[G t = Alerted|G t−1 = Normal] to be the transition probability from Normal state to Alerted state and λ A,A = P r[G t = Alerted|G t−1 = Alerted] to be the probability of staying in Alerted state when the previous state is also Alerted. The transition matrix Λ of the Markov chain can be written as
We assume the transition probabilities are known to the retailer; this may come from statistical analysis such as a survey of consumer attitudes. The one step transition function, defined by
represents the belief that the consumer is in Alerted state at time t + 1 given p t , the Alerted state belief at time t.
Modelling Assumption 2: (State transitions)
Consumers have an inertia in that they tend to stay in the same state. Moreover, once consumers feel their privacy is violated, it will take some time for them to come back to
Normal state.
To guarantee Assumption 2 we consider transition matrices in (1) satisfying
and λ N,A ≥ 1 − λ A,A . Thus, by combining the above three inequalities, we have Figure 1 : Markov state transition model for a two-state consumer.
B. Retailer Model
At each time t, the retailer can take an action by offering a coupon to the consumer. We define the action at time t to be u t ∈ {HP, LP}, where HP denotes offering a high privacy risk coupon (e.g. a targeted coupon) and LP denotes offering a low privacy risk coupon (e.g. a generic coupon). The retailer's utility is modeled by a cost (negative revenue) which depends on both the consumer's state and the type of coupon being offered. If the retailer offers an LP coupon, it suffers a cost C L independent of the consumer's state: offering LP coupons does not reveal anything about the state. However, if the retailer offers an HP coupon, then the cost is C HN or C HA depending on whether the consumer's state is Normal or Alerted. Offering an HP (high privacy risk, targeted) coupon to a Normal consumer should incur a low cost (high reward), but offering an HP coupon to an Alerted consumer should incur a high cost (low reward) since an Alerted consumer is privacy-sensitive. Thus, we assume C HN ≤ C L ≤ C HA .
Under these conditions, the retailer's objective is to choose u t at each time t to minimize the total cost inccured over the entire time horizon. The HP coupon reveals information about the state through the cost, but is risky if the consumer is alerted, creating a tension between cost minimization and acquiring state information.
C. The Minimum Cost Function
We define C(p t , u t ) to be the expected cost acquired from an individual consumer at time t where p t is the probability that the consumer is in Alerted state and u t is the retailer's action:
Since the retailer knows the consumer state from the incurred cost only when an HP coupon is offered, the state of the consumer may not be directly observable to the retailer. Therefore, the problem is actually a Partially Observable
Markov Decision Process (POMDP) [13] .
We model the cost of violating a consumer's privacy as a short term effect. Thus, we adopt a discounted cost model with discount factor β ∈ (0, 1). At each time t, the retailer has to choose which action u t to take in order to minimize the expected discounted cost over infinite time horizon. A policy π for the retailer is a rule that selects a coupon to offer at each time. Thus, given that the belief of the consumer being in Alerted state at time t is p t and the policy is π, the infinite-horizon discounted cost starting from t is
where E π indicates the expectation over the policy π. The objective of the retailer is equivalent to minimizing the discounted cost over all possible policies. Thus, we define the minimum cost function starting from time t over all policies to be
We define p t+1 to be the belief of the consumer being in Alerted state at time t + 1. The minimum cost function V t β (p t ) satisfies the Bellman equation [13] :
An optimal policy is stationary if it is a deterministic function of states, i.e., the optimal action at a particular state is the optimal action in this state at all times. We define P = {[0, 1]} to be the belief space and U = {LP, HP} to be the action space. In the context of our model, the optimal stationary policy is a deterministic function mapping P into U. Since the problem is an infinite-horizon, finite state and finite action MDP with discounted cost, by [14] , there exists an optimal stationary policy π * such that starting from time t,
Thus, only the optimal stationary policy is considered because it is tractable and achieves the same minimum cost as any optimal non-stationary policy.
By (5) and (6), the minimum cost function evolves as follows: if an HP coupon is offered at time t, the retailer can perfectly infer the consumer state based on the incurred cost. Therefore,
If an LP coupon is offered at time t, the retailer cannot infer the consumer state from the cost since both Normal and Alerted consumer impose the same cost C L . Hence, the discounted cost function can be written as
Correspondingly, the minimum cost function is given by
III. OPTIMAL STATIONARY POLICIES
The first main result is a theorem providing the optimal stationary policy for the two-state basic model in Section II.
Theorem 1:
There exists a threshold τ ∈ [0, 1] such that the following policy is optimal:
More precisely, assume that δ
where for λ N,A ≥ τ ,
and for λ N,A < τ ,
where
The proof of Theorem 1 and supporting lemmas are in the Appendix. An immediate consequence of this result is an upper bound on p t for offering an HP coupon. 
represents the ratio between the gain from offering an HP coupon to a Normal consumer and the loss from offering an HP coupon to a consumer whom the retailer thinks is Normal but is actually Alerted.
To illustrate the performance of the proposed threshold policy, we compare the discounted cost resulted from the threshold policy with the greedy policy which minimize the instantaneous cost at each decision epoch as well as a lazy policy which a retailer only offers LP coupons. We plot the discounted cost averaged over 1000 independent MDPs w.r.t. time t for different decision policies in Figure 3 . The illustration demonstrates that the proposed threshold policy performs better than the greedy policy and the lazy policy. Figure 2a shows the optimal threshold policy with respect to λ N,A for three fixed choices of λ A,A . It can be seen that the threshold is increasing when λ N,A is small, this is because for a small λ N,A , the consumers is less likely to transition from Normal to Alerted.
Therefore, the retailer tends to offer an HP coupon to the consumer. When λ N,A gets larger, the consumer is more likely to transition from Normal to Alerted. Thus, the retailer tends to play conservatively by decreasing the threshold for offering an LP coupon. When λ N,A is greater than κ, the retailer will just use κ to be the threshold for offering an HP coupon. One can also observe that with increasing λ A,A , the threshold τ decreases. On the other hand, for fixed C HN and C HA , Figure 2b shows that the threshold τ increases as the cost of offering an LP coupon increases, making it more desirable to take a risk and offer an HP coupon.
The relationship between the discount factor β and the threshold τ as functions of transition probabilities is shown in Figure 4 . It can be seen in Figure 4a that the threshold increases as β increases. This is because when β is small, the retailer values the present rewards more than future rewards. Therefore, the retailer tends to play conservatively so that it will not "creep out" the consumer in the present. Figure 4b shows that the threshold is high when λ A,A is large or λ N,A is small. A high λ A,A value indicates that a consumer is more likely to remain in Alerted state. The retailer is willing to play aggressively since once the consumer is in alerted state, it can take a very long time to transition back to Normal state. A low λ N,A value implies that the consumer is not very privacy sensitive. Thus, the retailer tends to offer HP coupons to reduce cost. One can also observe in Figure 4b that the threshold τ equals to κ after λ N,A exceeds the ratio κ. This is consistent with results shown in Figure 2 .
The effect of an LP coupon cost on the threshold for different discount factors is plotted in Figure 5 . It can be seen that a higher C L will increase the threshold because the retailer is more likely to offer an HP coupon when the cost of offering an LP coupon is high. 
IV. CONSUMER WITH MULTI-LEVEL ALERTED STATES
In this section, the case that the consumer has multiple Alerted states is studied. We define G t ∈ {Normal, Alerted 1 , . . . Alerted K } to be the consumer state at time t. If the consumers is in Alerted k state, it is even more cautious about coupons than in Alerted k−1 state.
The transition matrix is defined to be
We denoteē i to be the i th row of the transition matrix (21). At each time t, the retailer can offer either an HP or an LP coupon. We define C HN , C HA1 , . . . , C HAK to be the costs of the retailer when an HP coupon is offered while the state of the consumer is Normal, Alerted 1 , . . . , Alerted K , respectively. If an LP coupon is offered, no matter in which state, the retailer gets a cost of C L . We assume that
belief of the consumer being in Normal, Alerted 1 , . . . , Alerted K state at time t is defined by p N,t , p A1,t , . . . , p AK ,t , respectively. The expected cost at time t has the following expression:
Assume that the retailer has perfect information about the belief of the consumer state, the cost function evolves as follows: by using an LP coupon at time t, where T (p t ) =p T t Λ is the one step Markov transition function. By using an HP coupon at time t,
Therefore, the minimum cost function is given by (10) . In this problem, since the instantaneous costs are nondecreasing with states when the action is fixed and the evolution of belief state is the same for both LP and HP, the existence of an optimal stationary policy with threshold property for finite many states is guaranteed by Proposition 2 in [15] . The optimal stationary policy for a three-state consumer model ( Figure 6 ) is illustrated in Figure ? ?. For fixed costs, the plot shows the partition of the belief space based on the optimal actions and reveals that offering an HP coupon is optimal when p N,t , the belief of the consumer being in Normal state, is high.
V. CONSUMERS WITH COUPON-DEPENDENT TRANSITION
Generally, consumers' reactions to HP and LP coupons are different. To be more specific, a consumer is likely to feel less comfortable when being offered a coupon on medication (HP) than food (LP). Thus, we assume that the Markov transition probabilities are dependent on the coupon offered.
As shown in Figure 8 , if an LP coupon is offered, the state transition follows the Markov chain Otherwise, the state transition follows
According to the model in Section II,
Moreover, we assume that offering an HP coupon will increase the probability of transition to or staying at Alerted state. Therefore, λ 
Otherwise,
where T (p t ) = λ N,A (1 − p t ) + λ A,A p t is the one step transition defined in Section II.
Theorem 2:
Given action dependent transition matrices Λ LP and Λ HP , the optimal stationary policy has threshold structure.
The proof is similar to the proof of Theorem 1 except that there are two transition matrices correspond to two different coupons. Thus, it is omitted for brevity. Figure 9 shows the effect of costs on the threshold τ . We can see that, for fixed coupon costs, the threshold for offering an HP coupon to a consumer with coupon dependent transition probabilities is lower than our original model without coupon-dependent transition probabilities. The retailer can only offer an LP coupon with certain combination of costs; we call this the LP-only region. It can be seen that the LP-only region for the couponindependent transition case is smaller than that for the coupon-dependent transition case since for the latter, the likelihood of being in an Alerted state is higher for the same costs. 
VI. CONCLUSION
We proposed a POMDP model to capture the interactions between a retailer and a privacy-sensitive consumer in the context of personalized shopping. The retailer seeks to minimize the expected discounted cost of violating the consumer's privacy. We showed that the optimal coupon-offering policy is a stationary policy that takes the form of an explicit threshold that depends on the model parameters. In summary, the retailer offers an HP coupon when the Normal to Alerted transition probability is low or the probability of staying in Alerted state is high.
Furthermore, the threshold optimal policy also holds for consumers whose privacy sensitivity can be captured via multiple alerted states as well as for the case in which consumers exhibit coupon-dependent transition. Our work suggests several interesting directions for future work: cases where retailer has additional uncertainty about the state, for example due to randomness in the received costs, game theoretic models to study the interaction between the retailer and strategic consumers, and more generally, understanding the tension between acquiring information about the consumers and maximizing revenue.
APPENDIX:
Lemma 1: The minimum cost when the decision horizon starts from t and only spans m stages is defined to be 
By using induction on t, we can easily prove V 
Lemma 2:
The minimum cost function V t β (p) is a concave and non-decreasing function of p. Proof: We prove these properties by induction. We define V t,m β to be the minimum cost when the decision horizon starts from t and only spans k stages. For k = 1,
which is a concave function of p. For k = n − 1, assume that V 
In this case, C L + βV β,HP (T (τ )) = V β,HP (τ ).
Substitute (8) and (1) 
Next, we present how to compute V β (λ N,A ) and V β (λ A,A ). 
Since N → ∞ and 0 ≤ β ≤ 1,
we have:
